Blind quantum computing [A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and E. Kashefi, Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 517 (2009)] is a secure cloud quantum computing protocol which enables a client (who does not have enough quantum technology at her disposal) to delegate her quantum computation to a server (who has a universal quantum computer) without leaking any relevant information to the server. In [T. Morimae and K. Fujii, Phys. Rev. A 87, 050301(R) (2013)], a new blind quantum computing protocol, so called the measuring-Alice protocol, was proposed. This protocol offers several advantages over previous protocols, such as the device-independent security, less demanding requirements for the client, and a simpler and stronger security based on the no-signaling principle. In this paper, we show composable security of the measuring-Alice protocol by using the formalism of the constructive cryptography [U. Maurer, Proceedings of Theory of Security and Applications, TOSCA 2011, pages 33-56. Springer (2011) ]. The above advantages of measuring-Alice protocol enable more intuitive and transparent proofs for the composable security.
I. INTRODUCTION
A first generation quantum computer will be expensive and high-maintenance, and therefore will be implemented in a "cloud" style like today's supercomputers. In such a cloud quantum computing, the most important problem is to guarantee the client's privacy. Blind quantum computation [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] is a new secure quantum computing protocol which can protect the security of client's privacy in such a cloud quantum computing. Protocols of blind quantum computation enable a client (Alice), who does not have enough quantum technologies at her disposal, to delegate her quantum computation to a server (Bob), who has a full-fledged quantum computer, in such a way that Alice's input, output, and program are hidden to Bob [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
An unconditionally secure protocol of blind quantum computation with almost classical Alice was first proposed by Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi (BFK) [1] . Their protocol uses measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC) on the cluster state (graph state) by Raussendorf and Briegel [12] . A proof-of-principle experiment of the BFK protocol has also been achieved recently with a quantum optical system [3] . The BFK protocol has been generalized to other blind quantum computing protocols which use MBQC on the Affleck-Kennedy-Lieb-Tasaki (AKLT) state [5, 13, 14] , continuous-variable MBQC [7, 15] , topological MBQC [6, 16] , and the ancilla-driven model [10, 17] .
In these BFK-based protocols, Alice has to possess a device which emits randomly-rotated single-particle states, such as single-photon states. If Alice's device * Electronic address: morimae@gunma-u.ac.jp † Electronic address: koshiba@mail.saitama-u.ac.jp
is not perfect, and sometimes wrongly emits more than two photons, extra photons can be exploited by malicious Bob to learn Alice's information, by using, for example, the photon number splitting attack [18] [19] [20] [21] . Therefore, it is necessary for Alice to precisely control the number of emitted photons, which is not easy with today's technology. In Ref. [9] , a complementary protocol of the BFK-type protocol, so called measuring-Alice (MA) protocol, was proposed by Morimae and Fujii. In this protocol, Alice has only to perform measurements in stead of state preparations. These measurements are not necessary to be single-photon measurements: they can be polarization measurements with a threshold detector. Since a polarization measurement with a threshold detector is much easier than a creation of a single-photon state, MA protocol eases Alice's burden. Furthermore, as is shown in Ref. [9] , this protocol offers the device-independent security for Alice, which means that Alice does not need to trust her device: even if Alice's device does not work correctly, Bob cannot learn Alice's information. Finally, it was shown [9] that the security of MA protocol is based on the no-signaling principle, which is more fundamental than quantum physics [22] . Because of the no-signaling principle, the proof of the security of MA protocol becomes very simple.
If Bob cannot learn anything about Alice's computation whatever he does, we say that the protocol offers "blindness" [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . (Here, we ignore unavoidable leakage of trivial information, such as the upper bound of the computational size, or whether Alice's output is classical or quantum, etc. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .) In fact, all BFK-type blind protocols and MA protocol satisfy the blindness.
The "verifiability" is another important concept in could quantum computing. The verifiability means that Alice can check whether Bob is following the correct protocol. If malicious Bob deviates from the correct proto-col, the verifiability enables Alice to detect it with high probability, and therefore the probability for Alice of accepting a wrong result can be exponentially small. Fitzsimons and Kashefi (FK) recently introduced a modified version of the BFK protocol which satisfies the verifiability [2] . The verifiability of MA protocol was shown in Ref. [8] .
However, all previous results (except for Ref. [11] ) consider only stand-alone security. The stand-alone security means that the protocol is secure during a single execution of it in an isolated environment. The stand-alone security is often proven by showing that the mutual information between honest party and malicious party is exponentially small.
The stand-alone security establishes the security of a protocol as a primitive, and often gives important insights for deep understanding of protocols. Therefore, it is a first goal to show the stand-alone security of a cryptographic protocol. However, the stand-alone security is not sufficient if we consider a protocol in a broader and hence more realistic scenario. For example, the (standalone) unconditional security of the quantum key distribution protocol (QKD) [23, 24] has been proven by many researchers by showing that the accessible information is exponentially small. Here, the accessible information is the mutual information between the distributed key and the outcome of an optimal measurement on the adversary's system. However, it was pointed out in Ref. [25] that even if the accessible information is small, the key might not be enough secure if it is used in another protocol, such as the one-time pad encryption, due to the locking [26] , which is a purely non-classical property.
If we want to guarantee the security of a protocol in such a broader context, we have to show the composable security [27, 28, [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . The composable security means the security of a primitive protocol in a general environment. For example, a protocol is secure even if it is used many times as subroutines of a larger protocol. The composable security of QKD was shown in Ref. [36] . The composable security of the key recycling in authentication was studied in Ref. [37] .
The composable security of the BFK-type protocols were studied in Ref. [11] . They showed the composable blindness of the BFK protocol and the composable blindverifiability of the FK protocol by using the constructive cryptography [27, 28] . Although the composable security of MA protocol was also studied in Ref. [11] , it is not sufficient, since they showed only the composable blindness: the composable device-independent blindness, which is a new feature of MA protocol, was not shown. Furthermore, the composable blind-verifiability of MA protocol was neither considered.
In this paper, we study the composable security of MA protocol. For that purpose, we utilize the framework of the constructive cryptography [27, 28] . We will introduce two types of MA protocols, one is without verification and the other is with verification, and will show the composable security of them. Hence, the device-independent blindness and the verifiability of MA protocol are shown to be composable. We will see that our proofs of the composable security are much simpler than those of BFK type protocols due to the simplicity of the stand-alone security of MA protocol based on the no-signaling principle.
This paper is organized as follows. We will first review some necessary backgrounds, including the nosignaling principle (Sec. II), MBQC (Sec. III), MA protocol (Sec. IV), and the constructive cryptography and the composable security (Sec. V). We will then show our results in Sec. VI and Sec. VII. The discussion is given in Sec. VIII.
II. NO-SIGNALING PRINCIPLE
No-signaling principle is one of the most fundamental principles in physics, and quantum theory also respects it. Formally, it is explained as follows. Let us assume that Alice and Bob share a physical system, which might be classical, quantum, or even super-quantum (Fig. 1 ). For example, Alice and Bob share the Bell pair,
where the subscript A (B) indicates Alice (Bob) possesses the qubit. As is shown in Fig. 1 , Alice chooses her measurement parameter x (such as the measurement angles of a spin), and performs measurement. She obtains the result a. Bob also chooses his measurement parameter y, and performs measurement. He obtains the result b. The nosignaling principle (from Alice to Bob) is defined by
for all b, x, x ′ , and y, where P (α|β) is the conditional probability distribution of α given β. Equation (1) means that the change of Alice's measurement parameter does not affect the probability distribution of Bob's measurement result. In other words, the shared system cannot transmit any message from Alice to Bob.
Alice Bob Interestingly, the no-signaling principle is more fundamental than quantum theory in the sense that there is a theory which is more non-local than quantum theory, but respects the no-signaling principle [22] .
III. MEASUREMENT-BASED QUANTUM COMPUTING
In this section, we will review the basics of measurement-based quantum computing (MBQC) [12] . Readers who are familiar with it can skip this section.
MBQC is a new model of quantum computation whose computational power is equivalent to the traditional circuit model. In MBQC, we first prepare a highlyentangled N qubit (or more generally, qudit) state, which we call the resource state. We next perform measurement of each qubit. The measurement angle of a qubit depends on the results of the previous measurements. If the resource state is a universal resource state, we can simulate any quantum circuit with the adaptive local measurements.
A canonical example of universal resource states is the cluster state [12] :
where |+ ≡
(|0 +|1 ), N qubits are allocated on sites of the two-dimensional square lattice,
is the controlled-Z gate between ith qubit and jth qubit, and (i, j) is a pair of nearest-neighbour sites. Here, I j is the identity operator acting on jth qubit, and Z j is the Pauli Z operator acting on jth qubit.
Let us see Fig. 2 . We first prepare the cluster state ( Fig. 2 (a) ). We then perform local adaptive measurements (Figs. 2 (b) and (c)). By changing measurement angles, we can generate any state U |+ ⊗N on the last layer of the cluster state ( Fig. 2 (d) ), where U is any Nqubit unitary operator. (Actually, what we create on the last layer is
where x j , z j ∈ {0, 1} are random binaries. We call
j the byproduct, and we say that we can implement U |+ ⊗N up to a byproduct. Since x j , z j are determined by measurement results, we can correct byproduct. )
IV. MEASURING ALICE PROTOCOL
In this section, we will review MA protocol [8, 9] . Let ρ in and U be the input and the program (unitary operation) of Alice's computation, respectively. In other words, Alice wants to implement U on ρ in , and obtain U ρ in U † . If Alice's input is classical, i.e., she knows the classical description of the input quantum state ρ in , or her input is a classical data, she does not need to start
The measurement-based quantum computing with the cluster state.
with ρ in : she can start with the standard state, such as |0 ⊗n , which is prepared by Bob, and the preparation of the initial state can be included in U .
Bellow, we will introduce two MA protocols. We will first explain a simpler one: a protocol without the verification. We will next explain a protocol with verification. These two protocols satisfy the device-independent blindness. Note that the device-independent verifiability is not guaranteed in the second protocol, because, as we will see later, the device-independent verifiability is impossible: a malicious device can always cheat Alice by pretending that all tests are passed.
A. Protocol without verification
Let us consider MBQC between two parties, Alice and Bob ( Fig. 3) : Bob first prepares a resource state |g , such as the cluster state, in his laboratory ( Fig. 3 (a) ). He next sends each particle to Alice one by one, and Alice measures each particle in a certain angle which is determined by her program U (Fig. 3 (b) ). The program is kept secret to Bob.
If Bob behaves honestly, i.e., generates the correct resource state and sends each particle correctly, the last layer of his resource state becomes U ρ in U † (up to byproducts) (Fig. 3 (c) ). If Bob sends it to Alice, Alice can obtain the correct quantum outcome (or if she needs the classical outcome, she can obtain the correct result by measuring it).
Since there is no message transmission from Alice to Bob, the no-signaling principle guarantees that Bob cannot learn anything about Alice's input, measurement angles (i.e., program), and outputs, whatever he does on his system [8, 9] . (As we said, we ignore trivial leakage of Alice's information. In this case, Bob can know the upper bound of the size of Alice's MBQC, since he creates the resource state.)
This protocol also satisfies the device-independent blindness, which means that whatever Alice's device does, Bob cannot learn Alice's secret. This is again shown by using the no-signaling principle: due to the no-signaling principle, Alice cannot send any message to Bob whatever she does. Therefore, even if her measuring device does not work correctly, Bob cannot gain any information about Alice's secret [8, 9, 29] . 
B. Protocol with verification
The above protocol does not satisfy the verifiability. In other words, if Bob behaves maliciously, Alice accepts a wrong result although Bob cannot learn Alice's secret. In order to achieve the verifiability, we modify the above protocol in the following manner.
Let us define the N -qubit state
where |g is an (|0 + |1 ), and P is an N -qubit permutation, which keeps the order of qubits in |g . (Since Alice does not have any quantum memory, the order of particles in |g should not be permutated.) This permutation is randomly chosen by Alice and kept secret to Bob.
Bob prepares a sufficiently large universal resource state |G in his laboratory (Fig. 4 (a) ). He sends each qubit of it to Alice one by one, and Alice measures each qubit (Fig. 4 (b) ) until she creates the N -qubit state σ q |Ψ P in Bob's laboratory, where
2N is the byproduct of MBQC [12] (Fig. 4 (c) ). Here, X j and Z j are Pauli operators acting on jth qubit. Throughout this paper, we assume that there is no communication channel from Alice to Bob. Then, due to the no-signaling principle, Bob cannot learn anything about q and P [9] . If Bob can learn something about P , Alice can transmit some message to Bob by encoding her message into P , which contradicts to the no-signaling principle. Furthermore, if Bob can learn something about q, Alice can exploit this fact to transmit her message to Bob.
Bob sends each qubit of σ q |Ψ P to Alice one by one, and Alice does MBQC on σ q |Ψ P with correcting σ q (Fig. 4 (d) ). This means that before measuring jth qubit of σ q |Ψ P she applies σ † q | j on jth qubit, where σ † q | j is the restriction of σ † q on jth qubit. For example, (I ⊗ XZ ⊗ Z)| 2 = XZ. Qubits belonging to |g are used for MBQC to realize the unitary U on the input ρ in . Note that this computation is done with a quantum error correcting code with the code distance d. States |0 and |+ are used as "traps" [2] . In other words, she measures Z on |0 and X on |+ , and if she obtains a minus result, she rejects the result of the computation. If results are plus for all traps, she accepts the result of the computation.
If malicious Bob wants to deviate from the above protocol, he might apply some operations on his system, or even he generates completely different state G ′ in stead of |G . In this case, he changes traps with high probability, since he does not know the place of traps. In particular, if Bob wants to change the logical qubit of Alice's computation, he has to access at least d qubits, which increases the probability of changing traps. It was shown in Ref. [8] that the probability that the logical state is changed and no trap is flipped is at most
where d is the distance of the quantum error correcting code. In other words, the probability that Alice accepts a wrong result is exponentially small in d. (By doing the concatenation, d can be any large integer. In particular, it can be sufficiently large for a given security parameter ǫ, which is introduced later.) In this way, the verifiability is achieved in MA protocol.
This protocol also satisfies the device-independent blindness due to the no-signaling principle. However, note that the device-independent verifiability is not satisfied, because a malicious device can always cheat Alice by outputting plus results for all trap tests.
V. COMPOSABLE SECURITY
In this section, we will explain the basics of the composable security [27, 28, [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] concentrating on our setup, namely two-party protocols with one alwayshonest client, Alice, and one possibly-malicious server, Bob. Although we will use the constructive cryptography [27, 28] , similar results may be obtained in the framework of Ref. [32, 33] .
In the framework of the constructive cryptography [27, 28] , a protocol π is represented by an engine which has input and output ports, and performs some functionality. Protocols implement (approximate) the ideal functionality S by using a resource R. The ideal functionality S has a switch, f : f = 0 corresponds to honest Bob and f = 1 corresponds to malicious Bob.
For example, as is shown in Fig. 5 (a) , Alice's protocol π A and Bob's protocol π B interact (exchange inputs and outputs) with the resource R. If the combination π A Rπ B , which is considered as a new resource, is ǫ-close to S f =0 ,
we say that π A , π B , and R are ǫ-composable correct. (We will see later why we say "composable".) Here, ǫ-close is defined by the diamond-norm as
where O tr is the trace norm of an operator O, and we assume that all inputs and outputs of π A Rπ B and S are quantum states. (Classical information is encoded in orthogonal quantum states.) On the other hand, as is shown in Fig. 5 (b) , if there exists an engine σ, which we call a simulator, such that π A R is ǫ-close to Sσ,
we say that π A and R are ǫ-composable secure. (We will see later why we say "composable".) Again, the ǫ-close means
where we assume that all inputs and outputs of π A R and Sσ are quantum states. Equation (3) has two very important meanings. Firstly, it gives a clear definition of security: it is a closeness of the real protocol to the ideal functionality. Secondly, as we will explain later, it also guarantees the secure composition of the protocol.
Let us first explain why Eq. (3) defines the security. As is shown in Fig. 6 , Eq. (3) suggests that the environment (distinguisher), which interacts with π A R or Sσ, cannot distinguish π A R and Sσ within ǫ. Equation (3) also suggests that for any attack D by the distinguisher against π A R, there exists an attack Dσ against S which causes the same effects to the distinguisher within ǫ. Therefore, if π A R is not secure against an attack D, S is insecure against the attack Dσ, since the distinguisher cannot distinguish π A R and Sσ (what the distinguisher gains are the same). However, it contradicts to the assumption that S is secure against any attack. Therefore, π A R is secure against any attack within ǫ. 
These equations mean the composability of the protocol. A protocol might be secure if we use it only a single time in an isolated environment. Such a security is called the stand-alone security. However, if the protocol is used in a subroutine of a larger protocol, the security of the entire protocol is no longer guaranteed. The above two equations guarantee the security in such a composable setting. Equation (4) means the following (Fig. 7) . Let us assume that we can realize an ideal functionality T by using a protocol π ′ and a resource S up to the error ǫ ′ . Furthermore, we also assume that the resource S can be realized by using a protocol π and a resource R up to the error ǫ. Then, we can realize T by using the composition π ′ • π and R up to the error ǫ + ǫ ′ . Equation (5) means that if we run a protocol π up to the error ǫ and a protocol π ′ up to the error ǫ ′ in parallel, we can realize the ideal functionality S|S ′ up to the error ǫ + ǫ ′ . Now it is clear why we call Eq. (3) the "composable" security. The composable correctness is also understood in a similar way.
VI. COMPOSABLE SECURITY OF THE MA PROTOCOL WITHOUT VERIFICATION
In this section, we will show our first result, the composable security of the MA protocol without verification, which was explained in Sec. IV A.
Alice's protocol π A , Bob's protocol π B , and the resource R (a one-way quantum channel) are illustrated in Fig. 8. π A accepts • the input ρ in from the first port,
• the classical description [U ] of the program U from the second port,
• the description w of the "behavior of Alice's device" from the fourth port,
• a state g ′ from the fifth port (g ′ = |g g| if Bob is honest).
π B generates the resource state |g of the measurementbased quantum computation, and sends each qubit to π A through R.
π A runs as follows.
1. If w = 0, Alice's device works correctly. In other words, π A performs MBQC with input ρ in , program [U ], and resource state g ′ . π A then outputs the outcome ρ out of the MBQC from the third port.
2. If w = 0, Alice's device does some wrong behavior specified by w. In this case, π A generates ρ out according to ρ in , [U ], g ′ , and w, and outputs it from the third port. The ideal functionality S and the simulator σ are illustrated in Fig. 9 . The filtered port (fifth port) is colored in blue. σ sets f = 1, accepts a state g ′ from the first port, and outputs it from the second port.
S simulates π A in its inside. S runs as follows.
• S accepts the input ρ in from its first port, and forwards it to the first port of the simulated π A .
• S accepts the classical description [U ] of the program U from its second port, and forwards it to the second port of the simulated π A .
• S accepts w from its fourth port, and forwards it to the fourth port of the simulated π A .
• If f = 0, S inputs |g into the fifth port of the simulated π A . If f = 1, S accepts a state g ′ from the fifth port, and forwards it to the fifth port of the simulated π A .
• S gets ρ out from the third port of the simulated π A , and outputs it from S's third port. The ideal functionality S and the simulator σ. S simulates πA in its inside. The yellow circle means that the element is not directly forwarded: if f = 0, |g is input to the fifth port of the simulated πA, whereas if f = 1 g ′ is forwarded to the fifth port of the simulated πA.
Let us first check the correctness. If f = 0, S inputs |g into the fifth port of the simulated π A . It is equivalent to the simulation of π A Rπ B , since what Rπ B does is also inputting |g into the fifth port of π A . Therefore,
Hence we obtain the ǫ-composable correctness with ǫ = 0.
Next let us show the composable device-independent blindness. What Sσ does is inputting a state g ′ into the fifth port of π A , which is equivalent to the work of π A R. Therefore,
Hence we obtain the ǫ-composable device-independent blindness with ǫ = 0.
VII. COMPOSABLE SECURITY OF MA PROTOCOL WITH VERIFICATION
In this section, we show our second result, the composable security of the MA protocol with verification, which was explained in Sec. IV B.
Alice's protocol π A , Bob's protocol π B , and the resource R (a one-way quantum channel) are illustrated in Fig. 10 . π A accepts
• the input ρ in of the computation from the first port,
• the classical description [U ] of the program from the second port,
• the description w of the behavior of Alice's device from the fifth port,
• a state G ′ from the sixth port (G ′ = |G G| if Bob is honest.)
Bob's protocol π B generates the resource state |G and sends each particle to Alice one by one through R.
If w = 0, Alice's device works correctly. In other words, π A runs as follows.
1. π A generates a random N -qubit permutation P .
2. π A performs the MBQC M P on G ′ , where M P is the MBQC such that σ q |Ψ P is generated if G ′ = |G G|.
4. π A performs the computation U on ρ in by using |g . If Bob is malicious, |g might be different state, and then U is not correctly implemented. π A also checks all trap qubits.
If all traps pass the test, π
A outputs e = 0 from the fourth port. If at least one trap does not pass the test, π A outputs e = 1 from the fourth port.
6. π A outputs the output ρ out of the computation from the third port. If Bob is honest, ρ out = U ρ in U † . If he is malicious ρ out might be different state.
If w = 0, Alice's device does some wrong behavior specified by w. Then, π A runs as follows.
1. π A generates ρ out and e according to ρ in , [U ], G ′ , and w.
2. π A outputs ρ out from the third port, and e from the fourth port.
The ideal functionality S and the simulator σ are illustrated in Fig. 11 . The filtered port is colored in blue. σ accepts a state G ′ from the first port and outputs it from the second port. σ switches f = 1.
• S accepts the program [U ] from its second port, and forwards it to the second port of the simulated π A .
• S accepts the description w from its fifth port, and forwards it to the fifth port of the simulated π A . • If f = 0, S inputs |G into the sixth port of the simulated π A . If f = 1, S accepts a state G ′ from its sixth port, and forwards it to the sixth port of the simulated π A .
• S gets e from the fourth port of the simulated π A , and outputs it from S's fourth port.
• S gets ρ out from the third port of the simulated π A .
• If w = 0, S outputs ρ out from S's third port. If w = 0, S works as follows:
-If e = 0, S outputs U ρ in U † from S's third port.
-If e = 1, S outputs ρ out from S's third port. Let us first show the correctness, Eq. (2). We first consider the case w = 0. π A Rπ B always outputs e = 0 and U ρ in U † . On the other hand, S f =0 inputs |G into the sixth port of the simulated π A . Then the simulated π A always outputs e = 0 and U ρ in U † . Because e = 0, S always outputs U ρ in U † from its third port. Therefore,
We next consider the case w = 0. In this case, the output ρ out from the third port of the simulated π A is directly output from the third port of S. If f = 0, S inputs |G into the sixth port of the simulated π A , which is equivalent to the work of Rπ B . Therefore, again we have shown π A Rπ B = S f =0 . In short, we have shown the ǫ-composable correctness with ǫ = 0. Now let's move on to the security. Our goal is to show Eq. (3). In the following, we will show that Eq. (3) is satisfied for ǫ = 2δ, where δ is the exponentially small probability that Alice accepts a wrong outcome in the verifiable MA protocol.
A. w = 0 First let us assume w = 0. As is shown in Fig. 12 , the distinguisher prepares a system D, and divides it into three subsystems, inputs D 1 into the first port of π A , and D 2 into the first port of R. The distinguisher also inputs [U ] into the second port of π A . Let e 0 and e 1 are two orthogonal states which represents e = 0 and e = 1, respectively. If
where U D1 means U acts on D 1 , I D3 means I acts on D 3 , and Tr D2 (D) means the partial trace of D over D 2 .
If
where η is a certain state which distinguisher gets if e = 1, η error is the state which distinguisher gets when more than d qubits of the resource state are affected by errors during the computation, 0 < δ < 1 is an exponentially small number, and 0 ≤ α < 1.
On the other hand, as is shown in Fig. 13 , let us assume that the distinguisher inputs D 1 into the first port of S, D 2 into the first port of σ, and [U ] into the second port of S.
Therefore, the distance between π A R and Sσ is upper bounded by 
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have shown the composable security of the measuring Alice protocol by using the constructive cryptography.
In Ref. [11] , authors introduced the definition of the stand-alone ǫ-blind verifiability, and showed it is equivalent to the composable ǫ-blind verifiability (Theorem 5.3 of Ref. [11] ). They also defined the stand-alone ǫ-blindness, the stand-alone ǫ-verifiability, and the standaloneǭ-independent ǫ-verifiability. They showed that the stand-alone blindness and the independent verifiability means the composable security (Lemma 6.6, Theorem 6.7, and Corollary 6.8). Since the FK protocol [2] satisfies these individual stand-alone definitions, they conclude that FK protocol is composable secure (Appendix C of Ref. [11] ). It might be possible to show the composable blind-verifiability of MA protocol by showing in a similar way, i.e., first showing that MA protocol satisfies the above individual stand-alone definitions and then use Theorem 6.7 of Ref. [11] . However, these individual definitions are introduced for the BFK-type setup, i.e., Alice generates some states and exchanges quantum states and classical messages between Bob. Therefore directly showing the composable security of MA protocol, which we have done in this paper, seems to be easier and more transparent. It would be a subject of future work to investigate the relation between MA protocol and the above individual stand-alone definitions.
where η, η * , and η * * are certain states, and E and F are certain CPTP maps. If we consider σ ′ σ as the simulator for T , this shows Eq. (4).
